Электронная библиотека
Взаимосвязь корпоративного управления и финансовых рисков: обзор эмпирических исследований
Щепелева М.А.
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Банковские риски: теория, практика, методологияВведение | |
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Анализ результатов эмпирических исследований | |
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Конфликт интересов стейкхолдеров в финансовом институте | |
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Реформа системы корпоративного управления финансовыми институтами | |
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ЗаключениеИсточники |
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Щепелева Мария Александровна
Аспирант кафедры прикладной экономики МГИМО (У) МИД России, аналитик департамента денежно-кредитной политики Банка России. Москва